BRICS: Nuclear Proliferation and International Security
Abstract
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been weakening globally. The countries that originally formed the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, People’s Republic of China, and South Africa) are the largest holders of nuclear weapons. Two of its members, Brazil and South Africa, dismantled their respective nuclear programs in the 1980s. Meanwhile, India, the People’s Republic of China, and Russia possess 6,487 nuclear warheads, with Russia holding the largest arsenal. Although all five countries are signatories to the NPT, the “nuclear option” is considered plausible in light of the geopolitical changes of the 21st century. Nuclear energy has dual uses. The BRICS countries agree on the importance of nuclear disarmament, but while the three nuclear-armed nations are modernizing and expanding their arsenals, Brazil debates how far its program can go beyond the civil sphere, while South Africa relies on nuclear energy for its development. This article argues that the possession of nuclear weapons has been a desire of all five countries at different times, and that nuclear disarmament is not a current goal for any of them. Russia, having dismantled a large portion of its arsenals along with the United States, does not wish to engage in a similar process with the People’s Republic of China or India, as this would reveal secrets in the respective verification processes. While Russia is the most nuclearized country and the leader of the group on this issue, there is no consensus policy on the matter with the rest of the BRICS. The purpose of this article is to analyze the evolution of the nuclear agenda within each of the five original BRICS members and the difficulties in forming a common agenda for nuclear nonproliferation globally. The methodology is descriptive, explaining the evolution of each member’s nuclear stance, and then, using foresight, proposing possible scenarios for global nuclear proliferation. The research question is whether the BRICS are in a position to agree on a common stance regarding nuclear nonproliferation and why.
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