Fishing social dilemmas in colombian pacific ocean: a analysis from game theory
Abstract
This paper focuses on the social rules study of the population that works in fishing activities in Colombian pacific ocean. For such effect, a non-cooperative game is established with imperfect complete information among the zone of fish producers community and owners of collection centers, which responds to the assumptions of agents' rational choice, from neoclassic school. The contribution of this paper is to characterize and model the phenomenon of direct trade of species from illegal fishing; within a methodological framework of game theory, and contrast the conditions of a Nash Equilibrium for such strategic interaction.Downloads
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